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“The analysis of revenue sharing has paid little attention to the different ways that revenues for
sharing can be collected or the basis of their allocation.” (Szymanski, 2003, p. 1182)
Abstract
A model of sharing revenues among groups when group members are ranked several
times is presented. The methodology is based on pairwise comparison matrices,
allows for the use of any weighting method, and makes possible to tune the level
of inequality. Our proposal is demonstrated on the example of Formula One prize
money allocation among the constructors. We introduce an axiom called scale
invariance, which requires the ranking of teams to be independent of the parameter
controlling inequality. The eigenvector method is revealed to violate this condition in
our dataset, while the row geometric mean method always satisfies it. The revenue
allocation is not influenced by the arbitrary valuation given to the race prizes in the
official points scoring system of Formula One.
Keywords: Decision analysis; pairwise comparisons; revenue allocation; Formula One;
axiomatic approach
MSC class: 62F07, 90B50, 91B08
JEL classification number: C44, D71
1 Introduction
Professional sports leagues and championships generate today billions of euros in common
revenue, as a result its allocation among the participants is often burdened with serious
legal disputes centred around unequal shares and the possible violation of competition
laws. Consequently, constructing allocation rules which depend only on a few arbitrary
variables, and are relatively simple, robust, and understandable for all participants, poses
an important topic of academic research.
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Formula One (Formula 1, or simply F1) is the highest class of single-seater car racing.
A Formula One season consists of several races taking place around the world. The
drivers and constructors accumulate points on each race to obtain the annual World
Championships, one for drivers, and one for constructors. Since running a team costs at
least 100 million US dollars,1 the distribution of Formula One prize money (1,004 million
US dollars in 20192) can substantially affect competitive balance and the uncertainty
around the expected outcome of races. The topic is also actual because Liberty Media,
the owner of the company controlling Formula One since January 2017, plans to reform
the revenue allocation of the championship.3
Hence, the current paper aims to propose a formal model which can be used, for
example, to share Formula One prize money among the constructors in a meaningful
way. The proposal is based on pairwise comparisons and has strong links to the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP), a famous decision-making framework. Our solution has the
following – mainly advantageous – features:
∙ The derivation of the pairwise comparison matrix from the race results depends
on a single variable, which regulates the inequality of the distribution. The user
can choose this by taking into account preferences on how much inequality is
desirable.
∙ It allows for the use of any weight deriving methods used in the AHP literature;
∙ Except for its sole parameter, the methodology is not influenced by any ad hoc
decision such as the scores used in the official points system of Formula One.4
∙ It supports the reliable performance of the bottom teams, which seldom score
points, therefore the current system awards if they achieve unexpected results,
mainly due to extreme events in some races.
Besides that, a reasonable axiom in our setting is introduced for weighting methods, and
its violation by the eigenvector method is presented in real data.
The proposed methodology can be applied not only for sharing Formula One prize
money among the constructors but in any area where resources/revenues should be
allocated among groups whose members are ranked several times. Potential examples
include further racing competitions such as Grand Prix motorcycle racing, combined events
in athletics like decathlon and heptathlon, the performance of countries in the Olympic
1 The study “Revealed: The $2.6 billion budget that fuels F1’s 10 teams” by Christian
Sylt is available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/csylt/2018/04/08/revealed-the-2-6-billion-
budget-that-fuels-f1s-ten-teams.
2 See the summary titled “Formula 1 teams’ prize money payments for 2019 revealed” by Dieter Rencken
and Keith Collantine, which can be accessed at https://www.racefans.net/2019/03/03/formula-1-
teams-prize-money-payments-for-2019-revealed/.
3 Consider the article “F1 2021: Liberty’s masterplan for Formula One’s future uncovered” by Di-
eter Rencken and Keith Collantine, available at https://www.racefans.net/2018/04/11/f1-2021-
libertys-masterplan-for-formula-ones-future-uncovered/. Another column titled “Revealed:
The winners and losers under Liberty’s 2021 F1 prize money plan” by Dieter Rencken and Keith Collantine
discusses the potential impacts of this plan and can be accessed at https://www.racefans.net/2018/
04/11/revealed-the-winners-and-losers-under-libertys-2021-f1-prize-money-plan/.
4 The long list of Formula One World Championship points scoring systems, available
at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Formula_One_World_Championship_points_scoring_
systems, highlights the arbitrariness of the rules, and suggests that the relative importance of the
different positions in a race remains unclear. Study also its criticism in Haigh (2009, Section 2).
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Games, schools on the basis of student tests in various subject areas, or even workplaces
where individual contributions on various projects are ranked.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related articles. The
methodology is presented in Section 3, and is applied in Section 4 to the Formula One
World Constructors’ Championship between 2014 and 2018. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Our work is connected to several research fields. First, revenue sharing and its impact
on competitive balance is a prominent topic of sports economics. Atkinson et al. (1988)
examine revenue allocation as an incentive mechanism encouraging the desired behaviour
of the teams in a league. Ke´senne (2000) analyses revenue sharing under the profit-
and utility-maximising hypothesis, and finds that equality promotes competitive balance.
However, revenue sharing can lead to a more uneven contest under reasonable assumptions
(Szymanski, 2003; Szymanski and Ke´senne, 2004). Bergantin˜os and Moreno-Ternero (2019)
give direct, axiomatic, and game-theoretical foundations for two simple rules used to share
the money coming from broadcasting sports leagues among participating teams.
Second, the proposed method is based on multiplicative pairwise comparison matrices
(Saaty, 1977, 1980), thus it continues the applications of the AHP in resource allocation
problems (Ramanathan and Ganesh, 1995; Saaty et al., 2007). For example, Ossadnik
(1996) extensively uses pairwise comparison matrices to allocate the expected synergies in
a merger to the partners. Furthermore, the current paper offers theoretical contributions
on this area. In particular, we consider two popular weighting methods and introduce a
reasonable axiom called scale invariance, that is, the ranking should be independent of the
variable governing the inequality of the allocation. Since it will be investigated whether
this requirement is satisfied by the two methods in the case of Formula One results, our
paper can be regarded as a companion to Duleba and Moslem (2019), which provides
the first examination of another property called Pareto efficiency (Blanquero et al., 2006;
Bozo´ki, 2014; Bozo´ki and Fu¨lo¨p, 2018) on real data.
Third, there are some direct applications of pairwise comparison matrices in sports
ranking. Csato´ (2013) and Csato´ (2017) recommend this approach to obtain a fair ranking
in Swiss-system chess team tournaments. Bozo´ki et al. (2016) address the issue of ranking
top tennis players of all time, while Chao et al. (2018) evaluate historical Go players.
Fourth, many articles have studied economic problems emerging in Formula One. Rule
changes seem to reduce the teams’ performances but to improve competitive balance,
and the revenue gain from the latter turns out to be bigger than revenue loss from the
former (Mastromarco and Runkel, 2009). Judde et al. (2013) undertake an econometric
analysis of competitive balance in this sport. Zaksaite˙ and Radusˇevicˇius (2017) examine
the legal aspects of team orders and other tactical decisions in Formula One. According to
Budzinski and Mu¨ller-Kock (2018), the revenue allocation scheme of this sport is consistent
with an anticompetitive interpretation and may be subject to an antitrust investigation.
Gutie´rrez and Lozano (2018) propose a framework for the design efficiency assessment
of some racing circuits that hosted Formula One. Henderson and Kirrane (2018) offer
a Bayesian approach to forecast race results. Schreyer and Torgler (2018) investigate
whether race outcome uncertainty affects the TV demand for Formula One in Germany,
and conclude that a balanced competition increases the number of viewers.
Fifth, our procedure leads to an alternative ranking of Formula One constructors, which
has its antecedents, too. Kladroba (2000) introduces well-known methods of aggregation to
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determine the World Championship in 1998. Some of the ranking problems that occurred
in the history of Formula One are found to result from defects of the Borda method
(Soares de Mello et al., 2005). Haigh (2009) illustrates the instability of the scoring
system and argues that any system should be robust to plausible changes, which is not
satisfied by the Formula One scoring rules. According to Anderson (2014), subjective
point-based rankings may fail to provide an accurate ranking of competitors based on
ability. Soares de Mello et al. (2015) present a variant of the Condorcet method with
weakly rational decision-makers to compare the teams which competed in the 2013 season.
Sitarz (2013) presents the incenter of a convex cone to obtain a new ranking of Formula
One drivers. Phillips (2014) measures driver performances by adjusting for team and
competition effects. Bell et al. (2016) aim to identify the best Formula One drivers of all
time. Corvalan (2018) addresses the problem of how the election of the world champion
depends on the particular valuation given to the race prizes.
3 Theoretical background
In this section, the main components of the model will be presented: the multiplicative
pairwise comparison matrix, its derivation from the race results, a straightforward axiom
in our setting, and a basic measure of inequality.
3.1 Multiplicative pairwise comparison matrices
Consider a set of alternatives 𝑁 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛} such that their pairwise comparisons are
known: 𝑎𝑖𝑗 shows how many times alternative 𝑖 is better than alternative 𝑗.
The sets of positive (with all elements greater than zero) vectors of size 𝑛 and matrices
of size 𝑛× 𝑛 are denoted by the symbols R𝑛+ and R𝑛×𝑛+ , respectively.
The pairwise comparisons are collected into a matrix satisfying the reciprocity condition,
hence any entry below the diagonal equals the reciprocal of the corresponding entry above
the diagonal.
Definition 3.1. Multiplicative pairwise comparison matrix : Matrix A = [𝑎𝑖𝑗] ∈ R𝑛×𝑛+ is a
multiplicative pairwise comparison matrix if 𝑎𝑗𝑖 = 1/𝑎𝑖𝑗 holds for all 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛.
We will sometimes omit the word “multiplicative” for the sake of simplicity.
Let 𝒜𝑛×𝑛 be the set of pairwise comparison matrices with 𝑛 alternatives.
Pairwise comparisons are usually used to obtain an approximation of the relative
priorities of the alternatives.
Definition 3.2. Weight vector : Vector w = [𝑤𝑖] ∈ R𝑛+ is a weight vector if
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1𝑤𝑖 = 1.
Let ℛ𝑛 be the set of weight vectors of size 𝑛.
Definition 3.3. Weighting method: Mapping 𝑓 : 𝒜𝑛×𝑛 → ℛ𝑛 is a weighting method.
The weight of alternative 𝑖 in the pairwise comparison matrix A ∈ 𝒜𝑛×𝑛 according to
the weighting method 𝑓 is denoted by 𝑓𝑖(A).
There exist several methods to derive a weight vector, see, for example, Choo and
Wedley (2004) for a thorough overview. The most popular procedures are the eigenvector
method (Saaty, 1977, 1980), and the row geometric mean (logarithmic least squares) method
(Crawford and Williams, 1980, 1985; De Graan, 1980; de Jong, 1984; Rabinowitz, 1976).
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Definition 3.4. Eigenvector method (𝐸𝑀): The weight vector w𝐸𝑀(A) ∈ ℛ𝑛 provided
by the eigenvector method is the solution of the following system of linear equations for
any pairwise comparison matrix A ∈ 𝒜𝑛×𝑛:
Aw𝐸𝑀(A) = 𝜆maxw𝐸𝑀(A),
where 𝜆max denotes the maximal eigenvalue, also known as the principal or Perron eigen-
value, of the (positive) matrix A.
Definition 3.5. Row geometric mean method (𝑅𝐺𝑀): The row geometric mean method
is the function A→ w𝑅𝐺𝑀(A) such that the weight vector w𝑅𝐺𝑀(A) is given by
𝑤𝑅𝐺𝑀𝑖 (A) =
∏︀𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑎
1/𝑛
𝑖𝑗∑︀𝑛
𝑘=1
∏︀𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑎
1/𝑛
𝑘𝑗
.
The row geometric mean method is sometimes called the Logarithmic Least Squares
Method (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑀) because it is the solution of the following optimisation problem:
min
w∈ℛ𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑛∑︁
𝑗=1
[︃
log 𝑎𝑖𝑗 − log
(︃
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
)︃]︃2
.
Although the application of the row geometric mean is axiomatically well-founded
(Fichtner, 1986; Barzilai, 1997; Lundy et al., 2017; Bozo´ki and Tsyganok, 2019), and
the eigenvector method has some serious theoretical shortcomings (Johnson et al., 1979;
Blanquero et al., 2006; Bana e Costa and Vansnick, 2008), Saaty’s proposal remains the
default choice of most practitioners. Therefore, both procedures will be considered.
3.2 From race results to a pairwise comparison matrix
A Formula One season consists of a series of races, contested by two cars/drivers of each
constructor/team. We say that team 𝑖 has scored one goal against team 𝑗 if a given car of
team 𝑖 is ahead of a given car of team 𝑗 in a race. Thus, if there are no incomparable cars,
then:
∙ Team 𝑖 (𝑗) has scored four (zero) goals against team 𝑗 (𝑖) if both cars of team 𝑖
have finished above both cars of team 𝑗;
∙ Team 𝑖 (𝑗) has scored three (one) goal(s) against team 𝑗 (𝑖) if one car of team 𝑖
has finished above both cars of team 𝑗, and the other car of team 𝑖 has finished
above one car of team 𝑗;
∙ Team 𝑖 (𝑗) has scored two (two) goals against team 𝑗 (𝑖) if one car of team 𝑖 has
finished above both cars of team 𝑗 but both cars of team 𝑗 have finished above
the other car of team 𝑖.5
The goals scored by the constructors in a race are aggregated over the whole season without
weighting, similarly to the official points scoring system.6
5 We follow the official definition in classifying a driver as finished if he completed over 90% of the
race distance.
6 Except for the 2014 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, which awarded double points as the last race of the
season.
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Consequently, the maximum number of goals that a team can score against another is
four times the number of races. Since a car might not finish a race, it is assumed that all
finishing car is better than another, which fails to finish. Nonetheless, two cars may be
incomparable if both of them failed to finish the race. In this case, no goal is scored. The
goals of the constructors are collected into the 𝑛× 𝑛 goals matrix.
The pairwise comparison matrix A = [𝑎𝑖𝑗] is obtained from the goals matrix: if
constructor 𝑖 has scored 𝑔𝑖𝑗 goals against constructor 𝑗, while constructor 𝑗 has scored 𝑔𝑗𝑖
goals against constructor 𝑖, then 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔𝑖𝑗/𝑔𝑗𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗𝑖 = 𝑔𝑗𝑖/𝑔𝑖𝑗 to guarantee the reciprocity
condition. Theoretically, this procedure is ill-defined because the problem of division by
zero is not addressed. However, in our dataset 𝑔𝑖𝑗 was always positive, in other words, at
least one car of every team was ahead of one car of any other team at least in one race
during the whole season. Thus the somewhat arbitrary adjustment of zeros in Bozo´ki et al.
(2016) can be avoided.
As we have mentioned, two weighting methods, the 𝐸𝑀 and the 𝑅𝐺𝑀 will be used to
derive a weight vector, which directly provides an allocation of the available amount.
The presented procedure does not contain any variable, thus it might lead to an
allocation which cannot be tolerated by the decision-maker because of its (in)equality.
Hence the definition of the pairwise comparison matrix is modified such that:
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
(︃
𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑔𝑗𝑖
)︃𝛼
and 𝑎𝑗𝑖 =
(︃
𝑔𝑗𝑖
𝑔𝑖𝑗
)︃𝛼
for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁,
where 𝛼 ≥ 0 is a parameter. If 𝛼 is small, then A is close to the unit matrix, the weights
are almost the same, and the shares remain roughly equal. The effect of 𝛼 will be further
investigated in Section 4.
3.3 A natural axiom for weighting methods
Some papers (Genest et al., 1993; Csato´ and Ro´nyai, 2016) examine ordinal pairwise
preferences, that is, pairwise comparison matrices with entries of 𝑎 or 1/𝑎. This idea has
inspired the following requirement, which is also an adaptation of the property called
power invariance (Fichtner, 1984) for the ranking of the alternatives.
Axiom 1. Scale invariance: Let A = [𝑎𝑖𝑗] ∈ 𝒜𝑛×𝑛 be any pairwise comparison matrix and
𝛽 > 0 be a (positive) parameter. Let A(𝛽) =
[︁
𝑎
(𝛽)
𝑖𝑗
]︁
∈ 𝒜𝑛×𝑛 be the pairwise comparison
matrix defined by 𝑎(𝛽)𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎
𝛽
𝑖𝑗. Weighting method 𝑓 : 𝒜𝑛×𝑛 → ℛ𝑛 is called scale invariant
if for all 1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛:
𝑓𝑖 (A) ≥ 𝑓𝑗 (A) ⇐⇒ 𝑓𝑖
(︁
A(𝛽)
)︁
≥ 𝑓𝑗
(︁
A(𝛽)
)︁
.
Scale invariance implies that the ranking of the alternatives does not change if a different
scale is used for pairwise comparisons. For example, when only two verbal expressions,
“weakly preferred” and “strongly preferred” are allowed, the ranking should remain the
same if these preferences are represented by the values 2 and 3, or 4 and 9, respectively.
In the setting of Section 3.2, scale invariance does not allow the ranking of the teams
to depend on the parameter 𝛼, which seems to be reasonable because the underlying data
(the goals matrix) are fixed. In other words, if constructor 𝑖 receives more money than
constructor 𝑗 under any value of 𝛼, then it should receive more money for all 𝛼 > 0.
Proposition 3.1. The eigenvector method does not satisfy scale invariance.
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Proof. A counterexample is sufficient for this purpose, which is provided by Genest et al.
(1993, Example 2.1) as Genest et al. (1993, Figure 1) shows.
Proposition 3.2. The row geometric mean method satisfies scale invariance.
Proof. Note that 𝑤𝑅𝐺𝑀𝑖 ≥ 𝑤𝑅𝐺𝑀𝑖 ⇐⇒
∏︀𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑎𝑖𝑘 ≥
∏︀𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑎𝑗𝑘 ⇐⇒
∏︀𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑎
(𝛼)
𝑖𝑘 ≥
∏︀𝑛
𝑘=1 𝑎
(𝛼)
𝑗𝑘 ,
which immediately verifies the statement.
3.4 Measuring inequality
A basic indicator of competition among firms is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.
Definition 3.6. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (𝐻𝐻𝐼): Let w ∈ ℛ𝑛 be a weight vector.
Its Herfindahl-Hirschman index is:
𝐻𝐻𝐼(w) =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑤2𝑖 .
The maximum of𝐻𝐻𝐼 is one when one constructor receives the whole amount. However,
its minimum (reached when all constructors receive the same amount) is influenced by the
number of constructors, therefore it is worth considering a normalised version of the 𝐻𝐻𝐼.
Definition 3.7. Normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman index (𝐻𝐻𝐼*): Let w ∈ ℛ𝑛 be a
weight vector. Its normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman index is:
𝐻𝐻𝐼*(w) = 𝐻𝐻𝐼(w)− 1/𝑛1− 1/𝑛 =
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=1𝑤
2
𝑖 − 1/𝑛
1− 1/𝑛 .
The value of 𝐻𝐻𝐼* is always between 0 (equal shares) and 1 (maximal inequality).
Since the 𝐻𝐻𝐼 better reflects market concentration, while the normalised Herfindahl-
Hirschman index quantifies the equality of distributions, we will use the latter.
4 Results
To illustrate the proposed allocation scheme, the 2014 Formula One season will be
investigated in detail. Table 1 shows the goals matrix where the teams are ranked
according to the official championship result (Sauber and Marussia both obtained zero
points in this year). For example, a car of Mercedes was better than a car of Red Bull on
61 occasions, while a car of Red Bull was better than a car of Mercedes on 14 occasions.
It can be seen that all entries above the diagonal are higher than the corresponding
element below the diagonal, thus a team, which has scored more points in the official
ranking, is almost always preferred to a team with a lower number of points by pairwise
comparisons. The only exception is Marussia vs Sauber, where the latter constructor has
a robust advantage.
Figure 1 plots the shares of the 11 competing teams with our methodology. Due to
the same underlying pairwise comparison matrix, results given by the eigenvector and
row geometric mean methods do not differ substantially. Mercedes is the dominant team
according to both methods, with an ever increasing share as a function of parameter 𝛼
(see Figure 1.a). There are five middle teams (Red Bull, Williams, Ferrari, McLaren,
Force India), which receive more money than the equal share in the case of small 𝛼 (see
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Table 1: Goals matrix, 2014
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Mercedes — 61 63 62 64 64 65 65 66 66 66
Red Bull 14 — 43 54 56 58 64 64 64 64 64
Williams 11 31 — 44 47 47 62 66 68 68 68
Ferrari 13 22 31 — 42 48 64 66 69 70 69
McLaren 11 20 29 34 — 41 59 65 69 70 71
Force India 12 16 28 28 35 — 52 61 64 63 64
Toro Rosso 10 7 11 12 16 21 — 47 56 54 56
Lotus 5 8 6 10 11 11 22 — 49 40 51
Marussia 6 8 7 7 7 7 15 16 — 28 34
Sauber 7 8 4 5 2 5 13 29 44 — 44
Caterham 3 8 5 6 3 4 15 12 22 23 —
Figure 1.b). Their ranking coincides with the official one for the row geometric mean,
although Ferrari, which has scored 216 points in the season, has only a negligible advantage
over McLaren, which has scored 181 points. On the other hand, the five weakest teams
(Toro Rosso, Lotus, Marussia, Sauber, Caterham) receive less if parameter 𝛼 increases (see
Figure 1.c). The row geometric mean ranking reflects the official ranking again, although
the difference between the shares of Marussia and Sauber is barely visible.
Proposition 3.2 guarantees that the ranking of the constructors according to their share
of the revenue remains unchanged as a function of 𝛼 if the row geometric mean method is
applied. Contrarily, the eigenvector method can lead to a rank reversal: Figure 1.b shows
that McLaren will receive a higher share than Williams if 𝛼 is bigger than 1.5. There are
two other changes in the ranking as revealed by Figure 2: Ferrari receives more money
than McLaren, and Marussia receives more money than Sauber for small values of the
parameter. Note that row geometric mean always favours the former teams, Ferrari and
Marussia.
Thus the violation of scale invariance by the eigenvector method – similarly to the
violation of Pareto inefficiency (Duleba and Moslem, 2019) – is not only a theoretical
curiosity (Proposition 3.1) as real data, in our case Formula One results from the 2014
season, may result in such an undesired rank reversal.
Figure 3 depicts the value of 𝐻𝐻𝐼* as a function of parameter 𝛼 in the five seasons
between 2014 and 2018. This can be especially relevant for a decision-maker who should
fix the rules before the start of a season with having in mind a maximal level of inequality.
For instance, choosing 𝛼 = 1 provides that the normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman index
will not exceed 0.31 if the given season remains more balanced than the 2017 season.
As our intuition suggests, a higher 𝛼 results in a more unequal distribution. It is also
worth noting that 𝐻𝐻𝐼* is consistently smaller in the case of row geometric mean than
for the eigenvector method. Furthermore, while the order of the seasons by the normalised
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for a given 𝛼 is relatively robust, the shape of the five lines
varies.
Finally, Table 2 summarises the allocation of revenues (in 2019) based on the 2018
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Figure 1: Revenue shares, 2014
(a) The top team: Mercedes
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(b) The five middle teams
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(c) The five bottom teams
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season. If the pot would be shared equally, then each team would receive 10 million US
dollars, thus constructor Haas is indifferent between its actual position and our proposal
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Figure 2: The difference between the revenue shares of some constructors
according to the eigenvector method (𝐸𝑀), 2014
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Figure 3: The normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman index (𝐻𝐻𝐼*), 2014-2018
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with 𝛼 = 0. By increasing this parameter, only the three top teams (Mercedes, Ferrari,
Red Bull) will receive more money, which immediately implies that Renault could not
receive its actual share (10.86%) under any 𝛼. The same holds for Red Bull.7 Mercedes
and Ferrari would be indifferent if 𝛼 = 0.35 as the last two columns of Table 2 show.
McLaren prefers our proposal until 𝛼 stands at a relatively small level. The remaining
four teams support the current allocation only if 𝛼 exceeds 0.55 when the normalised
Herfindahl-Hirschman index becomes about 0.05 (see Figure 3).
5 Conclusions
We have presented a model to share resources/revenues among groups in any area where
group members are ranked several times. The methodology is based on multiplicative
pairwise comparison matrices and makes possible to tune the level of inequality of the
allocation by its single parameter. Our proposal has been investigated through the example
of the Formula One World Constructors’ Championship. In this application, the proposed
7 Figure 1.b illustrates that a team might receive its maximal share for a particular 𝛼 > 0.
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Table 2: Revenue allocation based on performance in the 2018 season
Constructor Position Column 2 revenue Share (%) Equivalent 𝛼
Million US dollars 𝐸𝑀 𝑅𝐺𝑀
Mercedes 1 66 18.86 0.35 0.35
Ferrari 2 56 16.00 0.35 0.35
Red Bull 3 46 13.14 — —
Renault 4 38 10.86 — —
Haas 5 35 10.00 0 0
McLaren 6 32 9.14 0.13 0.14
Racing Point 7 24 6.86 0.6 0.61
Sauber 8 21 6.00 0.55 0.55
Toro Rosso 9 17 4.86 0.59 0.59
Williams 10 15 4.29 0.6 0.6
Column 2 revenue is paid on a sliding scale depending on the teams’ finishing posi-
tion. Source: https://www.racefans.net/2019/03/03/formula-1-teams-prize-money-
payments-for-2019-revealed/
technique has an important advantage over the official points scoring system of Formula
One as it is independent of the arbitrary valuation given to the race prizes. Since the
choice of the weighting method has only a marginal effect in the model, we recommend
using the row geometric mean, which has favourable theoretical properties.
The paper can inspire further research in various fields. The first possible direction
is the analysis of other weighting methods concerning scale invariance. The proposed
methodology provides a new ranking of the Formula One constructors, which can be
extended to the drivers, or compared to alternative ranking systems. Finally, representing
race results in a pairwise comparison matrix may encourage novel ways to measure
competitive balance by inconsistency indices (Brunelli, 2018).
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